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based on the evidence that the victim's hands had been cut off.
Vileness is characterized as conduct which was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." Stockton, 241 Va.
at 212, 402 S.E.2d at 207. Aggravated battery has been defined as
"qualitatively and quantitatively more culpable than the minimum
necessary to accomplish an act of murder." Smith v. Commonwealth,
219 Va. 455, 47S, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978).
Aggravated battery in Virginia "ordinarily connote[s] conduct
preceding death of the victim." Jonesv. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427,
448, 323 S.E.2d 554, 565 (1984). Stockton claimed that the finding
was unwarranted in his case because there was no evidence to suggest
that the victim's hands were removed prior to his being shot. However, the court found that even if the wounds were inflicted after the
gunshot, the victim would have become immediately unconscious and
death may not have been instantaneous. Either the gunshot or the
dismemberment could have caused death and the Commonwealth is
not required to prove the order of the infliction of multiple wounds.
Barnesv. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130,139-140,360 S.E.2d 196,203
(1987). Further, the court has stated that it is immaterial for the
purposes of the vileness determination whether the decedent remains
conscious during the course of several assaults. Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501,521,331 S.E.2d 407, 421 (1985). This determination allows the court to find aggravated battery and vileness even if
the victim is immediately unconscious though death may not be
instantaneous.
The cases cited by the court, however, deal with series of wounds
inflicted upon victims so that absolute order could not be established
conclusively and therefore, the particular wound ultimately causing
death could not be determined. The cases may be applied inappropriately by the Supreme Court of Virginia because the only circumstance
constitutionally reliable to support a death sentence is battery which
either by the quantity of the blows inflicted or by the manner in which
the crime was committed is indicative of an increased degree of
culpability in the defendant. Therefore, the victim's state of consciousness is not truly immaterial in the consideration of vileness as

the court asserts in this case. For additional treatment of this topic, see
Lago, Litigatingthe "Vileness" Factor,Capital Ddfense Digest, this
issue.
With regard to the "vileness" factor, the United States Supreme
Court has established that the statutory language of the factor alone is
insufficient to guide the jury in a constitutionally acceptable manner
and that a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction or definition of the factor must be communicated to the sentencer or applied
on appellate review. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980);
Maynard v. Cartwright,486 U.S. 356 (1988). In Stockton, the court
stated that "a murder-for-hire case imports its own special heinousness." This does not meet the Godfrey standard. Murder-for-hire
should not be considered as part of the statutory aggravating factors
as it is already part of the death-eligible offense. The court, instead,
equates the offense itself with vileness and offers no discussion of the
increased culpability of the defendant based on a qualitatively more
culpable battery.
It is important for Virginia attorneys to seek, pretrial, the narrowing construction of vileness to which they are entitled under Godfrey.
E. Federal Issues
The court also noted that Stockton had requested waiver of the
50-page limit on briefs imposed by Virginia Supreme Court Rule
5:26.
Defense counsel should keep in mind that any federal issues
which are not raised on appeal will not be heard on review. If the 50page limit on briefs imposed by the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Virginia is insufficient to cover all issues, a waiver of that page limit
should be requested. Even if the request is denied, a federal court may
be less inclined to find that issues not briefed due to page limitations
are defaulted.
Summary and analysis by:
Laura J. Fenn

SAUNDERS v. COMMONWEALTH
242 Va. 107, 406 S.E.2d 39 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On July 17, 1989, Saunders killed and robbed a man. Saunders
was indicted for capital murder pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-31(4)
(murder "in the commission of robbery, while armed with a deadly
weapon"). An eyewitness to the crime testified at the trial that
Saunders shot the victim and immediately began counting the victim's
money. A while later, at a friend's apartment, Saunders went to the
bathroom to wash the victim's blood off his hands. Another witness
testified that on the day after the crime, she told Saunders that she was
so upset over the crime that she could not sleep; Saunders replied,
"Don't let that bother y'all. I slept like a baby..."
The testimony at trial also revealed that Saunders, while awaiting
trial in jail, admitted to shooting the victim in the back of the head
because "he wouldn't give him the money." Yet Saunders presented
evidence that he killed the victim because he was white, thereby
attempting to show that the murder was motivated by race rather than
by robbery. Saunders attempted to show that the taking of the victim's
money was an afterthought.
At the penalty phase of Saunders' trial, two expert witnesses
testified as to whether Saunders "would commit criminal acts of

violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society."
Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.4(C). Saunders' expert witness testified
that Saunders' conduct and comments following the crime did not
necessarily show that Saunders would commit future crimes, while an
expert for the Commonwealth testified that there was a chance that he
would pose a future danger to society. Also during the penalty phase,
three witnesses testified that they had knowledge of Saunders having
committed an unadjudicated murder in the District of Columbia.
The court, sitting without a jury, sentenced Saunders to death
pursuant to the "future dangerousness" predicate. Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.4(C).
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that there was sufficient
evidence to support the conclusion that robbery was Saunders' motive
in committing the murder.
The court also held that the fact finder is free to disregard
conflicting expert testimony as to the "future dangerousness" of the
defendant. The court reasoned that future dangerousness is a factual
issue and that the fact finder must determine the weight to be given to
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expert testimony on that issue. 242 Va. 107, 114, 406 S.E.2d 39, 43
(1991), citing Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 303, 311, 329
S.E.2d 807, 813 (1985); Barefoot v. Estelle,463 U.S. 880, 891 (1983).
According to the court, because evidence established that
Saunders' crime was dispassionate and unprovoked and that the crime
was followed by a threat to silence an eyewitness to the crime, and
because the evidence included Saunders' past criminal record and
prior history, the trial court's finding of future dangerousness and its
consequential imposition of the death penalty were justified. The trial
court's sentence, the court held, was not tainted by passion or prejudice and was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases.

ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The court dismissed Saunders' claim that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of capital murder in the commission of a
robbery. Although the evidence suggested that the killing occurred
before Saunders took the victim's possessions, and that the robbery
may have been a mere afterthought, the court followed its precedents
by construing "in the commission of robbery," Va. Code Ann. § 18.231(4), very broadly. See Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66,286
S.E.2d 162 (1982)(holding that whether the victim is dead when the
theft occurs is immaterial) and Mosley, Robbery, Rape and Abduction: Alone and as Predicate Offenses to Capital Murder, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1990).
Saunders argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of unadjudicated crimes to show future dangerousness at the penalty
phase of his trial. Although the court noted that the trial court did not
base its findings and sentence on unadjudicated crimes, it is clear that
the use of this type of evidence at the penalty stage would have been
approved. See Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d
815 (1985). If unadjudicated crimes are admissible, it is imperative
that Virginia defense counsel acquire notice that the Commonwealth
intends to use this type of evidence. A motion in limine and a motion
for a Bill of Particulars are two means through which the defense may
demand to know what crimes, either adjudicated or unadjudicated,
will be used by the Commonwealth to show future dangerousness;
these motions are also mechanisms through which the defense may
seek to exclude the crimes from the proceedings.

Some adjudicated crimes are not relevant to the penalty phase of
a capital trial. Thus, defense counsel should also use the motion in
limine to exclude evidence of those crimes from the sentencing phase.
It is also advisable that defense counsel offer jury instructions
regarding the necessity that the fact finder conclude by some standard
of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence,
etc.) that the defendant committed the unadjudicated acts before they
may be considered as evidence of future dangerousness.
Likewise, since the Virginia Supreme Court held that the weight
to be accorded to expert testimony is a function of the fact finder,
Virginia defense counsel, faced with expert testimony supporting
future dangerousness, could offer jury instructions that reiterate the
notion that this type of testimony is merely "educated opinion"
testimony to which the jury does not have to give evidentiary weight.
Saunders also contended that the trial court erred in its finding of
future dangerousness. Saunders argued that evidence presented at the
penalty phase that showed that, while awaiting his sentencing hearing,
Saunders engaged in violent conduct within the jail unduly influenced
the trial court. However, the Virginia Supreme Court, in considering
this evidence, viewed it as falling under the purview of Code §19.2264.4(C) in that Saunders' behavior while he awaited sentencing was
part of "the prior history of the defendant."242 Va. at 117,406 S.E. 2d
at 45. The court found Saunders' post-trial conduct to be "uniquely
probative of future dangerousness," because it felt that the impending
penalty phase "would prompt model behavior." 242 Va. at 119, 406
S.E. 2d at 46.
It can be argued that post-trial conduct should never be allowed
into evidence, for Virginia's statute authorizes only the defendant's
history prior to the offense, not the defendant's history prior to
sentencing.
Finally, the court held that a defendant who murders and then
expresses no regret or remorse for his crime is proper evidence for the
sentencer to consider in its finding of future dangerousness; however,
the parameters of the defendant's lack of remorse must be confined to
the time of the offense (arguably, the time immediately surrounding
the offense). The Commonwealth should not be permitted to violate
the defendant's fifth amendment rights by arguing, for instance, that
the defendant's silence at trial is evidence of a lack of remorse.
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles

YEATTS v. COMMONWEALTH
1991 WL 184812 (VA.)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Ronald Dale Yeatts was convicted of robbery and capital murder in
the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. Based
upon a finding only of "future dangerousness," thejury set Yeatts' penalty
at death. The trial court accepted the jury's findings.
After spending the entire afternoon ofSeptember 23, 1989 drinking
alcohol and smoking marijuana and crack cocaine, Yeatts and Charles
Michael Vernon, an acquaintance, befriended Mrs. Ruby Meeks Dodson
and then gained entrance into her house. Upon entry, Yeatts followed
Dodson to the kitchen, where she was later found dead, and Vernon
proceeded to the bedroom where he searched for money. Subsequently
YeattsjoinedVernoninthebedroom. There they found apocketbook with
seven hundred dollars. Vernon testified that as they were leaving he
noticed that Yeatts had bloody hands and a pocket knife that he had given
him. Yeatts told Vernon, "'I cut her throat, don't worry about it ... '

Yeattsv. Commonwealth, 1991 WL 184812, *1. Dodson's"death resulted
from a 'large incised wound of the right neck, with.., extensive bleeding
from the carotid artery and jugular vein.' The victim suffered at least
twelve other stab wounds to the face, neck, and Chest." Id. at * 12. Vernon
then drove Yeatts to a riverbank where Yeatts threw the pocket knife and
empty pocketbook into the river.
At the scene of the crime the police found sunglasses with a
fingerprint of Yeatts' girlfriend and bloody footprints identical in size and
type to Yeatts' tennis shoes. In addition to circumstantial evidence, Yeatts
implicated himself in Dodson's murder through statements given to the
police, his sister-in-law, and Vernon.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of
death, deciding numerous issues adversely to the claims raised by Yeatts.

